In the same way that sovereignty represents both a set of domestic political arrangements and a set of principles of international order which are mutually reinforcing and mutually redefining,1 so globalization is not the mere environment in which states find themselves, but an element within the (shifting) identity of the state itself. If this argument is allowed with respect to globalization specifically, what might be its more general import for theorizing within the field?
Traditionally, the discipline of International Relations has tended to reinforce the notion of a Great Divide, that the 'international' represents a field of political and economic forces distinct from the 'domestic' and hence needs to be studied within a separate framework and by means of its own tools of analysis. Typically, these have included anarchy, states-as-actors, balances of power and the resort to war. The occasional appeals to domestic 'analogies', intended to soften this separation, have, if anything, served simply to reconfirm it.2 Neorealism, in turn, amounted to a formidable reassertion of the autonomy of the international as a domain with its own political structure. Notwithstanding, recent years have witnessed a flurry of writings devoted to the idea of globalization.3 While much of this literature concen trates on the implications of globalization for the potency of the state, there has been little attempt to address explicitly the import of globalization for the wider theoretical assumptions which undergird the discipline.4 This article presents globalization as an opportunity to rethink the Great Divide and the analytical schemes which have been deployed to legitimize it. It does so by presenting the state as the common but contested ground which brings the international and the national together, rather than as the barrier which keeps them apart. In this way, it will be argued that globalization is more significant for its erosion of the internal/ external divide than for its erosion of state capacity. More directly, it will be suggested that such an analytical shift, already apparent in some of the International Political Economy discussions about the demise of national economies, might have utility for rethinking related issues about the viability of state capacity in the normative, democratic and security spheres as well.
There are a number of areas within IR theory which have been undergoing sub stantial repositioning for a number of years, mostly related to the seemingly more permeable nature of the territorial state. This has led to questioning of the idea of a national economy (within IPE), of the viability of the state as provider of security (within security studies), of the moral identity of the state (within normative IR theory) and of the sustainability of democratic institutions on a territorial state basis (within political theory). The issue of globalization permeates all these problems, and is to varying degrees portrayed as the cause of them. It follows that the manner in which we debate these problems is very much dependent upon our conception of globalization itself. At the same time, the way in which the processes of globalization are analysed may provide us with a model for moving forward along a broad theoretical front. While the separate issue areas each carry their own substantive agenda, they share common analytical frameworks. A convenient starting place for making these frameworks explicit is that provided by structural realism. Accordingly, this article will review the import of globalization for the analytic division between systemic and reductionist theories as set out in Kenneth Waltz's writings,5 less as an end in itself than as a preliminary stage to an engagement with the wider spectrum of areas in which the state is thought to be in a globalization-induced crisis. this categorically: A systems theory of international polities', he avers, 'deals with the forces in play at the international, and not at the national, level'.51 What is so deeply misleading about this exposition is that, even if it is true that at the extremities the fields of forces appear distinct, the state acts within both and the fields intersect: the area of their intersection is inexplicable in terms of reductionism or a systemic theory alone. Moreover, as Waltz concedes, it is not only the field which affects the objects, but conversely 'the objects affect the field'.52 This is assuredly the case and must mean that the state as an object affects both fields simultaneously. Accordingly, the objective for International Relations must now be to elaborate a framework which recognizes this fact.
One possible objection needs to be cleared away at the outset. Waltz relegates interactions between the units to the unit level. At this level, he certainly accepts that unit actions are influenced by interactions with the external, by the 'international'.

Accordingly, Waltz's scheme does allow for interaction between the domestic and the international. Could it not then be counter-argued that the present discussion misses the point? We can recognize internal/external interaction while still leaving intact his claim to a reductionist/systemic division of labour. So what is the problem?
The The idea that these external constraints constitute an element of the international structure, at least on a par with that found in the Waltzian analysis, has accordingly been set out in a more self-conscious and systematic way. The initial statement of this theme was provided by Webb in his discussion of the effects of international capital mobility: This adaptation of neorealist theory, which expands the concept of 'structure' to include aspects of the economic system, was further elaborated by Andrews who, in turn, emphasized the currently existing structural constraints 'to either unilateral or tenanced within the above structuralist accounts: the strategy must be to construct a framework which moves beyond the internal and the external but which does not do so by simply reducing the one to the other. In short, this suggested that no understanding of the international order was possible without an analysis of the domestic orders on which it was based: the two were functionally integrated in a way that defied analytical separation. More recently, the same theme has been further developed: look at the states which help to create it, and to comprehend the behaviour of states we need to see them as the repositories of distinctive international orders.
Beyond the Great
Compartmentalized analytical schemes prevent precisely the insight which only such an approach can offer.
Conclusion
Globalization as concept is in too embryonic a stage of development to substitute as a viable theory of International Relations.
